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Are Proposed African Monetary Unions Optimal Currency Areas? Real, 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Convergence Analysis
Abstract
Purpose – A spectre is hunting embryonic African monetary zones: the EMU crisis. This paper 
assesses  real,  monetary and fiscal  policy convergence  within the proposed WAM and EAM 
zones. The introduction of common currencies in  West and East Africa is facing stiff challenges 
in  the timing of  monetary convergence,  the imperative  of central  bankers  to  apply common 
modeling and forecasting methods of monetary policy transmission, as well as the requirements 
of common structural and institutional characteristics among candidate states.
Design/methodology/approach – In the analysis: monetary policy targets inflation and financial 
dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size;  real sector policy targets economic performance 
in terms of GDP growth at macro and micro levels; while, fiscal policy targets debt-to-GDP and 
deficit-to-GDP  ratios.  A  dynamic  panel  GMM  estimation  with  data  from  different  non-
overlapping intervals is employed. The implied rate of convergence and the time required to 
achieve full (100%) convergence are then computed from the estimations. 
Findings –  Findings  suggest  overwhelming  lack  of  convergence: (1)  initial  conditions  for 
financial development are different across countries; (2) fundamental characteristics as common 
monetary  policy  initiatives  and  IMF  backed  financial  reform  programs  are  implemented 
differently  across  countries;  (3)  there  is  remarkable  evidence  of  cross-country  variations  in 
structural  characteristics  of  macroeconomic  performance;  (4)  institutional  cross-country 
differences  could  also  be responsible  for  the  deficiency in  convergence  within  the  potential 
monetary  zones;  (5)  absence  of  fiscal  policy  convergence  and  no  potential  for  eliminating 
idiosyncratic fiscal shocks due to business cycle incoherence.
Practical implications –  As  a  policy  implication,  heterogeneous  structural  and  institutional 
characteristics  across  countries  are  giving  rise  to  different  levels  and  patterns  of  financial 
intermediary development. Thus, member states should work towards harmonizing cross-country 
differences  in  structural  and  institutional  characteristics  that  hamper  the  effectiveness  of 
convergence in monetary, real and fiscal policies. This could be done by stringently monitoring 
the implementation of existing common initiatives and/or the adoption of new reforms programs. 
Originality/value – It is one of the few attempts to investigate the issue of convergence within 
the proposed WAM and EAM unions.
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1. Introduction  
With much attention currently being focused on convergence criteria and preparedness of 
the aspiring member states of  embryonic African Monetary zones, candidate countries of the 
West  African  Monetary  Zone  (WAMZ)  have  twice  postponed  the  take–off  for  the  single 
currency. Central bank experts in the upcoming East African Monetary Zone (EAMZ) fear that, 
plans for a common currency in 2012 maybe too ambitious as central banks in the five countries 
are given little time to prepare for the monetary union. These could be the result of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) crisis that has sent a strong signal to other common currency regions on 
the goals of real, monetary and fiscal policy convergence. A paramount lesson of the EMU crisis  
is that serious disequilibria results from regional arrangements not designed to be robust to a 
variety of shocks (Willet, 2010; Willett & Srisorn, 2011). In designing the EMU, institutions’ 
almost  exclusive  concern  was  placed  on  mitigating  crises  caused  by  financial  sectors.  The 
official  stance  of  the  German  government  today  appears  to  remain  that,  failure  of  these 
safeguards is the predominant cause of the crisis. A position which can be reasonably argued for 
Greece, although its loss of competiveness has also been a major factor. 
Borrowing from AON (2012), today some experts assert that knowledge to implement 
reforms needed for a single currency region is lacking in several central banks of the EAMZ. In a 
recent meeting, central bankers agreed on the need for capacity-building in economic forecasting 
and  modeling  among  staff  to  get  them  ready  for  the  upcoming  monetary  union.  A  report 
evaluating the capacities of each of the central banks found there were great needs for training 
programs, especially in key modeling and forecasting methods as participants noted great gaps in 
their usages. In an opening statement, Claver Gatete, Deputy Governor of the Rwanda National 
Bank made it  clear that,  the importance of economic modeling and forecasting could not be 
underestimated2. In order to ensure timely and effective implementation of the road map to a 
2He stressed these were key instruments in monetary policy formulation.  It is also a way of providing the central  
banks  with clear and efficient ways of  assessing  trends and developments in domestic and external economies. “It  
is useful in monitoring where the economy stands and how to make short and long-term projections in order to  
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single currency in the WAMZ, the Convergence Council has urged members states to pursue 
appropriate monetary and fiscal policies, as well as rigorous implementation of the structural and 
institutional  policies  under  the  ECOWAS  Multilateral  Surveillance  Mechanism,  in  order  to 
achieve convergence and a durable monetary union on a sustainable basis. Three issues result 
from these  stylized  facts:  (1)  the  need  for  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  convergence;  (2)  the 
imperative  of  central  bankers  to  understand  modeling  and forecasting  methods  in  monetary 
policy  transmission  and;  (3)  the  requirement  of  common  structural  and  institutional 
characteristics among candidate members. 
In this paper, we examine the three issues by assessing real, monetary and fiscal policy 
convergence within the  WAM and  EAM zones. This work contributes to the current debate on 
single currency unions by analyzing elements of macroeconomic, monetary and fiscal policies. 
These include: financial intermediary dynamics (of depth, efficiency, activity and size), inflation, 
economic performance, external debt and budget deficit/surplus. In so doing, it provides an in-
depth picture of the state of  convergence, the speed of convergence and, the time required to 
achieved full convergence in real, monetary and fiscal policies. The rest of the paper is structured 
in  the  following  manner.  Section  2  examines  existing  literature.  Data  and  methodology  are 
respectively  presented  and discussed in  Section  3.  Empirical  analysis,  discussion and policy 
implications are covered in Section 4. We conclude with Section 5.
2. Existing literature 
2.1 Motivations for convergence in the run-up to a monetary zone 
Putting aside the premise of the EMU crisis highlighted above, the absence of studies that 
focus on financial convergence in the African continent constitute a concrete motivation for this 
paper. Though a number of studies have focused on financial market convergence worldwide, 
the emphasis has often been on developed and the emerging economies of Latin America and 
determine what monetary policy to follow. There is a need for a central bank to have a clear understanding of its  
monetary transmission mechanisms” Gatete (AON, 2012).
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Asia. Borrowing from Alagidede (2008), such neglect is not unexpected as African financial 
markets are viewed as too risky and little developed in operating and institutional environmental 
settings.  Political  strife  and  economic  instability  have  plagued  most  African  countries  and 
continue to pose a significant threat to foreign investments and private capital flows (Kenyan 
post election crises in 2007/2008, Zimbabwe’s economic downturn, Nigeria’s marred transition 
in 2008, the unending Egyptian revolution and currently Nigeria’s fuel subsidy related social 
unrest  and  threat  of  Islamic  fundamentalism).  With  very  few  exceptions  (South  Africa  for 
example),  African countries  are yet  to rise as emerging economic powers. This might  partly 
elucidate  the  relative  lack  of  academic  research  on  financial  convergence  in  the  continent. 
However, in recent years Africa has witnessed significant economic and financial developments; 
which have led to growing initiatives on common currency unions.  
Single currency unions are expected to provide gains in growth by favoring a breeding 
atmosphere for competition  and efficiency in the banking sector. These gains result from price 
reductions in financial  services which provide direct gains to customers and indirect benefits 
through reduction of lending rates that favor investment (Weill, 2009). Financial convergence is 
crucial in assessing the outcome of deregulation policies aimed at ameliorating the performance 
and efficiency of the financial intermediary sector (Casu & Girardone, 2010). Financial theory 
considers  integrated  markets  to  be  relatively  more  efficient  than  divergent  ones.  Thus,  an 
integrated financial intermediary market within a monetary zone improves cross-border flow of 
funds, stimulates trading volume which in-turn improves liquidity. Integrated banking markets 
provide investors with the opportunity of efficiently  allocating capital to economic operators 
(Chen et al., 2002). The ensuing effect is lower cost of capital for firms and lower transaction 
cost  for  investors  (Kim et  al.,  2005).  Therefore,  when  banks  are  integrated  within  a  single 
currency area, there are positive rewards to financial stability as it diminishes the probability of 
asymmetric shocks (Umutlu et al., 2010). Financial stability in-turn could attenuate the risk of 
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cross-border financial contagion (Beine et al., 2010) and augment the capacity of economies to 
absorb shocks (Yu et al., 2010).
The need for convergence in the banking sector within the WAM and  EAM zones draws 
on the tenets of arbitrage and hypothesis proffered by the portfolio theory. Dynamics of financial 
intermediation converge to mirror the level of arbitrage activity. When they converge, it implies 
a  common momentum such as  arbitrage  activity  is  bringing the  markets  together.  This  will 
reduce the potential for making above normal profits through international diversification (Von 
Furstenberg & Jeon, 1989).  In the same spirit,  if  deterrents   or potential  barriers  generating 
country risks  and exchange rate  premiums  are  absent,  the  consequence  is  similar  yields  for 
financial  assets  of  similar  risk  and  liquidity  regardless  of  locality  and  nationality  (Von 
Furstenberg & Jeon, 1989).  Hence,  the motivations  for  convergence  in banking markets  has 
premises  on  the  literature  of  financial  intermediary  sector  interdependence  and  portfolio 
diversification  (Grubel,  1968;  Levy  &  Sarnat,  1970).  A  great  chunk  of  these  papers  have 
considered  short-term  links  of  stock  markets  and  found  the  presence  of  short-term  co-
movements.  This  approach  has  been  extended  to  long-run  financial  market  co-movements 
(Bessler & Yang, 2003)..
Theoretical literature on fiscal convergence is scanty (Kocenda et al., 2008). Based on a 
simple theoretical framework where agents agree on the long-term goals, Onorante (2004) shows 
that fiscal constraints lead to implicit  coordination characterized by lower deficits,  controlled 
inflation  and  lower  interest  rates.  The  model  provides  an  argument  for  benefits  of  fiscal 
convergence for acceding countries and stability in the existing EMU. In this regard, existing 
literature  on  fiscal  policy  coordination  in  the  EU  countries  provides  support  to  theoretical 
benefits of fiscal policy coordination (Faini, 2006; Afonso & Rault, 2007). There is also ample 
evidence  that  fiscal  convergence  is  systematically  associated  with  enhanced  business  cycles 
synchronization,  eliminating  idiosyncratic  fiscal  shocks  along  with  evidence  that  reduced 
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primary  fiscal  deficits  (or  higher  surpluses)  ameliorate  coherence  of  business  cycles  across 
countries (Artis et al., 2008). The argument is that, the increased business cycle coherence along 
with fiscal convergence make countries within the region better candidates for a currency union 
(Darvas et al., 2005). 
In  light of the above points, the financial system exerts a significant influence on modern 
economic literature debates (Scholtens & Naaborg, 2005). On a first note, the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism’s  effectiveness  is  contingent  on the financial  system (Bondt,  2000). 
Secondly,  it  is believed to affect channels through which finance is tied to economic growth 
(Allen & Gale, 2000). Therefore, the financial system interacts with the economy by producing 
information ex-ante about possible investments, monitoring of investments, allocation of capital, 
facilitation  of  trade,  diversification  and  management  of  risks,  mobilization  and  pooling  of 
savings, as well as easing of goods and services (Levine, 2004).
 The above paragraph is important to the context of this paper because, it points to how 
and why assessing dynamics within homogenous financial and economic systems could elucidate 
the  three  issues  resulting  from  stylized  facts  we  have  highlighted  above.  Plainly  put, 
investigating convergence in financial intermediary dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and 
size within a financial system on the one hand, and calculating their corresponding speeds of 
convergence and time required for full (100%) convergence on the other hand, address quite a 
number important policy issues in the present debate over timing and monetary convergence 
within upcoming African single currency zones. To complement monetary policies, this paper 
also examines convergence in real and fiscal policies. Real policy convergence is examined in 
terms of macroeconomic performance (GDP growth) and per capita economic prosperity, while 
fiscal policy convergence is investigated in terms of debt-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP ratios. 
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2.2 The WAM and EAM zones 
Literature pertaining  to the WAM and EAM zones could be classified into two main 
strands. While the first is dedicated to the latter region, the second is focused on the former. 
To the best  of our  knowledge only two empirical  papers  have been dedicated  to  the 
embryonic  EAMZ.  Mkenda  (2001)  employ  a  Generalized  Purchasing  Power  Parity  (GPPP) 
model  to analyze  the suitability of the EAC (East African Community)  as a single currency 
union. The results which indicate that the real exchange rates between the EAC countries are 
cointegrated during the period 1980-98, suggest that the EAMZ is an optimal currency area. 
However  as pointed–out  by  Buigut  & Valev (2005),  the limitation  of  this  approach is  that 
movements in macroeconomic variables reflect the combined effects of shocks and responses 
(Angeloni  &  Dedola,  1999).  Hence,  this  methodology  does  not  distinguish  errors  from 
responses. Buigut & Valev (2005) empirically assess the suitability of the East African countries 
for  a  regional  monetary  union by testing  for  symmetry  of  the  underlying  structural  shocks. 
Results  suggest  that  supply  and  demand  shocks  are  generally  asymmetric,  which  does  not 
support  the forming of a single currency union. Buigut & Valev (2005) further stress that the 
speed and magnitude of adjustment to shocks is similar across the countries. Implying, more 
integration of the economies could lead to conducive conditions for a monetary union. 
Some studies have also focused on analyzing the feasibility of forming a monetary union 
in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In this second strand, Celasun 
& Justiniano (2005) have used a dynamic  factor analysis  to examine the synchronization of 
output fluctuations among member countries. Their results indicate that, small countries within 
ECOWAS experience relatively more synchronized output variations. Hence, they suggest that 
monetary unification among subsets of countries is preferable over wider monetary integration. 
Debrun et al. (2005) investigate the potential for monetary integration in the ECOWAS using a 
model  of  monetary  and fiscal  policy interactions.   Their  findings  suggest  that  the  proposed 
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monetary  union  is  desirable  for  most  non-West  African  Economic  and  Monetary  Union 
(WAEMU) countries, but not for the existing WAEMU member states. Tsangarides & Qureshi 
(2008) in applying hard and soft clustering algorithms to a set of variables suggested by the 
convergence  criteria  and  the  theory  of  optimal  currency  areas,  examine  the  suitability  of 
countries in the West African region to form the proposed monetary union (WAMZ). Findings 
reveal considerable dissimilarities in the economic characteristics of member countries. Much 
recently, Alagidede et al. (2011) have examined the inflation dynamics and common trends in 
the real  domestic  product  in  candidate  countries  of the embryonic  WAMZ. Using fractional 
integration  and  cointegration  methods,  they  establish  significant  heterogeneity  among  the 
countries. 
With much attention currently being focused on convergence criteria and preparedness of 
the aspiring member states,  this paper is inspired by the premise of the EMU crisis. Thus, we 
assess if candidate countries of potential African monetary zones have similar fundamental and 
structural characteristics for real, monetary and fiscal policy convergence. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data
We examine a sample of  4 West and 5 East African countries with data from African 
Development Indicators (ADI) and, the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) 
of the World Bank. While openness (trade),  inflation,  external  debts, budget deficits/surplus, 
public investment, GDP growth and GDP per capita growth  indicators are obtained from the 
former  source,  financial  intermediary  dynamics  are  gathered  from  the  latter.  Owing  to 
constraints  in  data  availability,  our  dataset  spans  from 1981  to  2009.  Details  on  countries, 
summary statistics, correlation analysis  and variable definitions  are provided in Appendix 4, 
Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively. The choice of variables is based on three 
facts.  (1)  Real  sector  policies  are  designed to  achieve  macroeconomic  performance  through 
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growth in GDP at national and per capita income levels. (2) Monetary policies are designed to 
keep inflation in check and improve financial intermediary dynamics of depth (money supply 
and liquid liabilities), efficiency (at banking and financial system levels), activity (from banking 
and financial system perspectives) and size. (3) Fiscal policy coordination is designed to keep 
debt-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP ratios in check. For organizational reasons, selected variables 
are classified into the following strands.
3.1.1 Financial variables 
a) Financial depth
Consistent with recent finance literature (Asongu, 2011abcd) and the FDSD, we measure 
financial depth both from overall-economic and financial system perspectives with indicators of 
broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively.  Whereas, 
the  former  denotes  the  monetary  base  plus  demand,  saving  and  time  deposits,  the  latter 
represents liquid liabilities. The basis for distinguishing these aspects of financial depth is the 
fact that, we are dealing exclusively with developing countries, in which a significant chunk of 
the monetary base does not transit through the banking sector (Asongu, 2011e). Both measures 
are in GDP ratios (see Appendix 3) and can robustly cross-check one another as either account 
for over 98% of variability in the other (see Appendix 2). 
b) Financial efficiency
In  the  context  of  this  paper,  financial  intermediation  efficiency  neither  refers  to  the 
production efficiency of decision making units, nor to the profitability-oriented concept in the 
banking  industry.  What  we  aim  to  elicit  is  the  ability  of  banks  to  effectively  meet  their 
fundamental role of transforming mobilized  deposits into credit for economic operators. Thus, 
we employ proxies for banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-efficiency (respectively 
‘bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on financial system deposits: 
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Fcfd’). Like with financial depth, these 2 intermediation efficiency proxies can cross-check each 
other as either reflect more than 92% of variability in the other (see Appendix 2).
c) Financial size
In accordance with the FDSD, we measure financial  intermediary size as the ratio of 
“deposit bank assets” to “total assets” (deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit 
bank assets: Dbacba). 
d) Financial activity
The concept of  financial intermediary  activity highlighted here is the ability of banks to 
grant credit to economic operators.  In order to ensure robustness, we proxy for both banking 
intermediary activity and financial intermediary activity with “private domestic credit by deposit 
banks: Pcrb” and “private  credit  by domestic  banks and other financial  institutions:  Pcrbof” 
respectively.  The latter  measure cross-checks the former as it  represents  more than 95% of 
variability in the former (see Appendix 2).
3.1.2  Other  variables
Borrowing from the convergence literature, we also measure the outcome of monetary 
policy with inflation  (Bruno et  al.,  2011).  Macro economic  performance is  accounted  for at 
macro and micro levels with GDP and GDP per capita  growth rates respectively.  We assess 
fiscal convergence with debt-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP ratios; consistent with Kocenda et al. 
(2008, 5). In accordance with past studies, we control for openness and public investment in the 
regressions (Pritchett, 1997; Bruno et al., 2011; Asongu, 2012). 
In  the  literature  on per  capita  income convergence  (and the  root  of  the  convergence 
theory),  an  important  clue  is  that  per  capita  incomes  of  countries  identical  in  structural 
characteristics such as preferences in technologies and government policies have the tendency to 
converge  to  one  another  if  the  countries  share  similar  fundamental  characteristics  (Prichett, 
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1997). In the current paper, these fundamental conditions are monetary,  fiscal and real sector 
policies. Hence, we proxy for preferences in technology and government policy with openness 
(trade) and public investment respectively.
3.2 Methodology
As underlined by  Fung (2009; 3),  the two equations below are the standard approaches 
in the literature for investigating conditional convergence if  tiW ,  is taken as strictly exogenous. 
titititititi WYYY ,,,,, )ln()ln()ln( εξηδβ τττ ++++=− −−−       (1)
tititititi WYY ,,,, )ln()ln( εξηδσ ττ ++++= −−                       (2)
 Where σ = 1+ β, tiY ,  is the proxy for per capita financial  or real sector growth in country i at 
period t.  tiW ,  is a vector of macroeconomic determinants (openness and public investment) of 
per capita finance (or real sector per capita),  iη  is a country-specific effect,  tξ  is a time-specific 
constant and  ti ,ε  is an error term. According to the exogenous  growth model, a statistically 
significant negative coefficient on  β  in Eq. (1) means that countries relatively close to their 
steady state of per capita  growth will experience a slowdown in growth of the per capita banking 
(real  sector)  development,  known  as  conditional  convergence  (Narayan  et  al.,  2011;  2). 
Concurring with  Fung (2009; 3), if  10 << σ in Eq. (2), then  tiY ,  is dynamically stable around 
the path with a trend growth rate the same as that of  tW , and with a height relative to the level of 
tW .  The variables contained in τ−tiW ,  and the individual effect iη  are indicators of the long-term 
level  the market (real sector) is converging to. Thus, the country-specific effect iη  highlights the 
existence of other determinants of a country’s steady state not captured by τ−tiW , .
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Conditions for convergence elucidated above are conditional on the strict exogeneity of 
tiW , .  Unfortunately,  this  is  not  practical  in  the  real  world.  Whereas,  openness  and  public 
investment (components of  tiW , ) influence per capita financial (real sector)  development, the 
reverse effect cannot be ruled-out. Thus, we are confronted with an issue of endogeneity  in 
which  openness (trade) and public investment are correlated with the error term ( ti ,ε ). More so, 
country and time specific effects could be correlated with other variables in the model, which is 
often the case when lagged dependent variables are part of the equations.  A means of dealing 
with  the  problem  of  the  correlation  between  the  individual  specific-effect  and  the  lagged 
endogenous  variables  involves  getting  rid  of  the  individual  effect  by  first  differencing. 
Therefore, Eq. (2) becomes:
)()()ln()ln()ln( ,,2,,2,,,, ττττττ εεδσ −−−−−− −+−+−=− titititititititi WWYYYY                  (3)
Even with this individual fixed effect eliminated, modeling by Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS)  is  still  biased  because  there  remains  a  correlation  between  the  lagged  endogenous 
independent  variable  and the  disturbance  term.  Arellano  & Bond (1991)  have  suggested  an 
application of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) that exploits all the orthogonality 
conditions between the endogenous retarded variables and the error term. This GMM approach 
has been extensively applied in the convergence literature (Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu, 2012). 
While  Narayan  et  al.  (2011) use Eq.  (1)  without  fixed  effects,  this  paper   employs  Eq.  (3)  
instead; in accordance with Fung (2009) and Asongu (2012). In specifying the model, we prefer 
the  two-step GMM  instead  of  the  one-step because,  it  corrects  the  residuals  for 
heteroscedasticity.  In  the  one-step,   the  residuals  are  considered  to  be  homoscedastic.  The 
assumption of no auto-correlation in residuals is crucial as past lagged variables are to be used as 
instruments for the endogenous variables. Also, the estimation is based on the assumption that 
the retarded values of the outcome variable and other explaining variables are valid instruments 
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in the regression. Assuming  the error terms of the level equation are not auto-correlated, the 
first-order auto-correlation of the differenced residuals should be significant while, their second-
order auto-correlation should not be. The validity of the instruments is assessed by the Sargan 
over-identifying restrictions (OIR)  test. 
As emphasized by Islam (1995; 14),  annual time spans are too short to be appropriate for 
studying  convergence,  as  short-term disturbances  may loom substantially  in  such brief  time 
spans. Therefore, owing  to our data span of 28 years, we borrow from Narayan et al. (2011) in 
using a 2 year non-overlapping interval such that, we have fourteen time intervals: 1980-1981; 
1982-1983 and so on.  By implication,  the autoregressive  order  τ is  set  to  2.  For  robustness 
purposes, we  also set τ to 3 and then to 4 in order to check the consistency of results. 
We also assess the implied rate of convergence by computing σ/2 which by virtue of Eqs. 
(1) and (2) is the equivalent of the  Narayan et al. (2011) computation with  (1+β)/2. Hence, the 
the estimated coefficient of the lagged differenced endogenous variable is divided by 2 because 
we have used a two year  non overlapping span to absorb short-term disturbances. When the 
absolute value of the estimated autoregressive coefficient is greater than zero but less than one (
10 << σ ), we confirm the alternative hypothesis of  convergence.  A detailed  interpretation 
suggests,  past  differences  have less  proportionate  impact  on future differences,  denoting  the 
variation on the left-hand side of Eq. (3) is diminishing overtime as the country is converging to 
a stable state. 
4. Empirical analysis 
This  section   investigates  three  main  issues:  (1)  assessment  of  convergence;  (2) 
determination  of the speed of convergence  and; (3) computation of the time needed for full 
(100%) convergence. Table 1 presents a summary of overall findings and addresses the first two 
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concerns while, Table 2 and Table 3 respectively report results for unconditional and conditional 
convergence. 
In  assessing  unconditional (absolute)  convergence,  only  the  lagged  difference  of  the 
endogenous variable is used as  exogenous variable while conditional convergence is in respect 
of  Eqs.  (2)  and  (3)  in  the  presence  of  control  variables.  It  follows  that,  unconditional 
convergence is estimated without tiW , : vector of determinants (openness and public investment) 
of per capita finance (or real sector per capita). In order to assess the validity of the model and 
correspondingly  the  convergence  hypothesis,  we  perform two  tests;  namely  the  Sargan  test 
which  examines  the  over-identification  of  restrictions,  and  the  Arellano  and  Bond  test  for 
autocorrelation which assesses the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Sargan OIR test 
investigates if the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the estimated equation. Its 
null hypothesis is the stance that, the instruments collectively  are  strictly exogenous (do not 
suffer from endogeneity), which is needed for the validity of the GMM estimates. We also report 
the Wald statistics for the collective significance of estimated coefficients.
 The  Sargan, autocorrelation and Wald tests statistics with corresponding p-values are 
reported in the tables. The Sargan test statistics often appear with a p-value greater than 0.10; 
hence, its null hypothesis is not rejected for the majority of models. Only results for the AR(2) 
test are reported  because, as opposed to the AR(1), it detects autocorrelation in levels. For all  
estimated  models,  we are  unable  to  reject  the  AR(2)  null  hypothesis  of  no  autocorrelation. 
Hence, there is robust evidence that all the models are free from autocorrelation.  
4.1 Summary of results 
In Table 1, we provide a synthesis of results. This summary is based on details reported 
in Tables 2-3. We report the states of convergence and corresponding speeds of convergence, 
notably: AC (Absolute Convergence), CC (Conditional Convergence), SAC (Speed of Absolute 
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Convergence) and SCC (Speed of Conditional Convergence). We notice that for the two panels, 
with regard to  real, monetary and fiscal policy dynamics, only banking system efficiency within 
the EAMZ reflects AC. 
Table 1: Summary of results on convergence 
Financial   Depth
Money Supply Liquid Liabilities
AC CC SAC SCC AC CC SAC SCC
WAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
EAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
Financial Efficiency
Banking  System Efficiency Financial System Efficiency
AC CC SAC SCC AC CC SAC SCC
WAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
EAMZ Yes(1%) No 28.90% --- No No --- ---
Financial   Activity
Banking System Activity Financial System Activity
AC CC SAC SCC AC CC SAC SCC
WAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
EAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
Financial Size and Inflation
Financial Size Inflation (CPI)
AC CC SAC SCC AC CC SAC SCC
WAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
EAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
Economic Performance  (GDP Growth)
GDP Growth GDP per capita Growth
AC CC SAC SCC AC CC SAC SCC
WAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
EAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
Fiscal Policy Convergence 
External Debt Budget Deficit/Surplus 
AC CC SAC SCC AC CC SAC SCC
WAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
EAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
AC:  Absolute  Convergence.  CC:  Conditional  Convergence.  SAC:  Speed  of  Absolute  Convergence.  SCC:  Speed  of  Conditional 
Convergence. WAMZ: West African Monetary Zone. EAMZ: East African Monetary Zone. CPI: Consumer Price Index. 
4.2 Results of absolute convergence
Table 2 below reports results of AC regressions. On a first note, all estimated models are 
autocorrelation-free and  have valid instruments,  since the null hypotheses of the AR(2) and 
Sargan-OIR  tests  are  not  rejected.  Where  the  lagged  endogenous  estimated  coefficient  is 
significant, the corresponding Wald statistics is also significant. This was not unexpected since 
only one endogenous variable is employed in the absolute convergence regressions: implying by 
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definition the statistics pertaining to the estimated coefficient is the same as the Wald statistics. 
We  notice  significant  evidence  of  convergence  only  within  the  EAMZ  in  banking  system 
efficiency. The speed of this AC is 28.90% per annum (p.a) and the time required to achieve full 
(100%) convergence is 6.92 years (yrs). 
Table 2: Absolute convergence
Financial  Depth Financial Efficiency Fiscal Policy Convergence 
Money Supply Liquid Liabilities Banking System 
Efficiency
Financial  System 
Efficiency
External Debt Budget 
Deficit/Surplus
WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ
Initial 0.021 0.204 -0.729 0.147 -0.997 0.578*** -0.288 -0.022 0.696 0.131 0.077 -0.299
(0.975) (0.718) (0.417) (0.812) (0.333) (0.000) (0.772) (0.932) (0.451) (0.854) (0.828) (0.752)
AR(2) -0.371 0.271 0.489 0.820 -0.455 0.853 -0.724 -0.051 0.868 -1.200 -0.966 -0.088
(0.710) (0.786) (0.624) (0.412) (0.648) (0.393) (0.468) (0.959) (0.385) (0.230) (0.333) (0.929)
OIR 1.934 1.670 0.943 1.886 0.765 3.509 2.879 4.048 3.976 3.413 1.210 2.397
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.943) (0.966)
Wald 0.000 0.130 0.657 0.056 0.933 41.52*** 0.083 0.007 0.566 0.033 0.046 0.099
(0.975) (0.718) (0.417) (0.812) (0.333) (0.000) (0.772) (0.932) (0.451) (0.854) (0.828) (0.752)
Countries 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 3 3
Obser 50 56 50 56 51 63 50 56 52 61 6 10
Financial  Activity Financial  Size Economic Performance Inflation(CPI)
Banking  System 
Activity
Financial System 
Activity
GDP  Growth GDPpc Growth
WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ
Initial -1.059 0.168 -1.095 0.233 0.117 0.814 -0.628 -1.384 0.484 0.107 -1.670 0.577
(0.236) (0.653) (0.231) (0.506) (0.791) (0.241) (0.352) (0.107) (0.516) (0.924) (0.128) (0.343)
AR(2) 0.340 0.462 0.531 0.759 0.734 0.047 -1.059 -1.515 1.003 0.030 -0.968 0.494
(0.733) (0.644) (0.595) (0.447) (0.462) (0.962) (0.289) (0.129) (0.315) (0.975) (0.333) (0.621)
OIR 0.270 2.298 0.203 2.500 1.528 4.276 2.225 1.288 3.791 3.269 0.220 4.812
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.999) (1.000) (1.000)
Wald 1.399 0.201 1.429 0.441 0.069 1.370 0.865 2.598 0.421 0.009 2.315 0.897
(0.236) (0.653) (0.231) (0.506) (0.791) (0.241) (0.352) (0.107) (0.516) (0.924) (0.128) (0.343)
Countries 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 3 5
Obser 50 56 50 56 51 60 36 42 21 20 39 56
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5%  and 1% respectively .  WAMZ: West African Monetary Zone. EAMZ: East African Monetary Zone. 
Syst: System.  Initial: lagged autoregressive estimated coefficient.  AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  Restrictions  
Sargan Test.  Wald:  statistics  for  joint  significance  of  estimates.  Obser:  Observations.  CPI:  Consumer  Price Index.   GDP: Gross Domestic  
Product. GDPpc : GDP per capita. 
4.3 Results of conditional convergence
Table 3 below presents  results of conditional convergence. We confirm the validity of 
the  models: all estimated models are autocorrelation-free and  have valid instruments, since the 
null hypotheses of the AR(2) and Sargan-OIR tests are not rejected. Unfortunately, we do not 
find any support for  CC  within any of the potential monetary zones for all policy measures  
under consideration. Owing to constraints in  degrees of freedom required  for the OIR test, we 
use  the  macroeconomic  conditioning  information  set  (public  investment  and  trade) 
interchangeably   and  find  the  same  results.   We  are  also  unable  to  condition  budget 
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deficit/surplus  in the fiscal convergence analysis  beyond a constant term because of limited 
degrees of freedom.
Table 3: Conditional convergence
Financial  Depth Financial Efficiency Fiscal Policy Convergence 
Money Supply Liquid Liabilities Banking System 
Efficiency
Financial  System 
Efficiency
External Debt Budget 
Deficit/Surplus
WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ
Initial -0.871 -0.809 -0.577 -0.784 -1.248 -0.115 -1.655 -1.582* -0.882 -0.498 0.205 -0.097
(0.310) (0.417) (0.684) (0.401) (0.371) (0.812) (0.407) (0.083) (0.389) (0.574) (0.718) (0.933)
Intercept -0.127 0.132 -0.142 0.177 -0.011 0.132 -0.067 -0.022 -190.68* 44.58 -0.959 2.141
(0.207) (0.340) (0.682) (0.332) (0.748) (0.261) (0.316) (0.448) (0.068) (0.399) (0.487) (0.339)
Trade -0.002 0.008 -0.002 0.009 0.004 0.0003 0.003 0.014 3.008* 1.621 --- ---
(0.106) (0.141) (0.538) (0.178) (0.526) (0.921) (0.345) (0.114) (0.054) (0.475)
Pub. I --- -0.016 --- -0.021 --- -0.007 --- 0.003 --- 10.252 --- ---
(0.337) (0.290) (0.762) (0.801) (0.742)
AR(2) 1.126 0.057 0.915 0.412 -0.618 1.079 -0.669 -1.655 1.289 0.713 -0.719 n.a
(0.259) (0.953) (0.359) (0.680) (0.536) (0.280) (0.503) (0.097) (0.197) (0.475) (0.472)
OIR 0.080 0.152 0.212 0.017 0.035 0.979 0.159 0.010 0.227 0.261 0.980 0.609
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.912) (0.999)
Wald 2.818 4.323 0.480 3.189 0.799 0.564 0.953 3.065 5.161* 2.746 0.129 0.007
(0.244) (0.228) (0.786) (0.363) (0.670) (0.904) (0.620) (0.381) (0.075) (0.432) (0.718) (0.933)
Countries 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 3 3
Obser 50 53 50 53 51 55 50 53 52 57 6 10
Financial  Activity Financial  Size Economic Performance Inflation(CPI)
Banking System 
Activity
Financial  System 
Activity
GDP  Growth GDPpc Growth
WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ
Initial -1.020 -0.716 -1.064 -0.583 -0.754 -0.707 -1.417* 1.325 0.621 -1.490 84.643 -0.535
(0.337) (0.264) (0.324) (0.277) (0.443) (0.388) (0.080) (0.899) (0.212) (0.273) (0.626) (0.609)
Intercept 0.067 0.290 0.059 0.206 -0.022 0.083** 4.288 -0.365 -5.988 0.221 115.96 0.689
(0.848) (0.145) (0.839) (0.212) (0.775) (0.034) (0.275) (0.892) (0.286) (0.725) (0.618) (0.737)
Trade -0.002 0.014 -0.001 0.012 -
0.004***
-0.002** 0.013 0.259 -0.088 0.039 -1.124 0.017
(0.522) (0.174) (0.600) (0.215) (0.000) (0.014) (0.731) (0.801) (0.619) (0.750) (0.622) (0.679)
Pub. I --- -0.016 --- -0.008 --- -0.003 --- --- --- 0.277 --- 0.108**
(0.496) (0.708) (0.579) (0.262) (0.035)
AR(2) 0.528 0.067 0.678 -0.059 0.226 0.949 0.879 -0.154 0.847 -1.196 0.427 0.405
(0.597) (0.946) (0.497) (0.952) (0.821) (0.342) (0.379) (0.877) (0.396) (0.231) (0.668) (0.685)
OIR 0.007 0.247 0.001 0.004 0.309 0.062 0.544 1.700 0.908 0.474 0.000 0.084
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
Wald 1.546 2.081 1.572 1.931 16.52*** 14.02*** 4.253 2.190 1.559 2.344 0.929 7.731*
(0.461) (0.555) (0.455) (0.586) (0.000) (0.002) (0.119) (0.334) (0.458) (0.504) (0.628) (0.051)
Countries 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 3 5
Obser 50 53 50 53 51 52 36 41 21 18 39 49
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5%  and 1% respectively .  WAMZ: West African Monetary Zone. EAMZ: East African Monetary Zone.  
Syst: System.  Initial: lagged autoregressive estimated coefficient.  AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  Restrictions  
Sargan Test.  Wald:  statistics  for  joint  significance  of  estimates.  Obser:  Observations.  CPI:  Consumer  Price Index.   GDP: Gross Domestic  
Product. GDPpc : GDP per capita.  Pub. I: Public Investment. n.a: not applicable owing to issues with degrees of freedom. 
4.4 Robustness checks 
In order to assess the consistency of the results, we perform three types of robustness 
tests.  Firstly,  for  every  regression  (whether  in  AC  or  CC  terms),  we  use  the  conditioning 
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information set singly and in pairs.  Secondly, we  set τ  to 3 and replicate the analysis in tables 2 
and 3. Lastly,  we set  τ to 4 and still  replicate the analysis.  In so doing,  we find results not 
significantly different from those in Tables 2-3. 
4.4.1 Setting τ to 3
When τ is set to 3, we notice no significantly different results from those in tables 2 and 
3. There is still evidence of AC in banking system efficiency within the EAMZ at a speed of  
14.23%  per annum and, time required to achieve a complete convergence of 21.08 years. No 
significant results are  noticed for the WAMZ.  We replicate the analysis with different pairs of 
the conditioning information set to further assess the robustness of the findings. 
4.4.1 Setting τ to 4
With τ  set to 4, the following new findings emerge. For the WAMZ, there is evidence of 
AC in real sector policies; with  speeds (time) of (for full) convergence in GDP and GDP per 
capita growths respectively: 12.57% p.a (31.82yrs) and 11.82% p.a (33.84yrs). The analysis is 
replicated with different pairs of the conditioning information set.
With  regard  to  the  EAMZ, we find  significant  results  only for  financial  depth.  With 
respect to the money supply dimension, convergence is at 22.25% p.a with a full converge period 
of  17.97yrs.  The  liquid  liability  dimension  of  financial  depth  has  a  convergence  rate  (full 
convergence period) of 21.45% p.a (18.64 yrs).  This EAMZ  analysis  is also replicated with 
different pairs of the conditioning information set.
Overall,  even after  using  different  combinations  of  τ (3  & 4)  and alternating  macro 
economic variables, results are not substantially different from those summarized in Table 1 and 
detailed in Tables 2-3. This implies, varying the manner in which short-term disturbances are 
mitigated in the GMM approach does not significantly change the results. 
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4.5  Discussion and policy implications
Before diving into the discussion of results, it is imperative at the outset to highlight the 
economic intuition and circumstances motivating absolute and conditional convergence in  real, 
monetary and fiscal policies within the WAMZ and EAMZ. The EMU crisis has sent a strong 
signal to other common currency regions on the imperatives of real, monetary and fiscal policy 
convergence. An  important lesson of the EMU crisis is that, serious disequilibria result from 
regional monetary arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of shocks (Willet, 2010; 
Willett & Srisorn, 2011). In fashioning the euro zone, institutions’ almost exclusive concern was 
placed  on limiting  crises  caused  by  financial  sectors.  The  official  position  of  the  German 
government today appears to maintain that, failure of these safeguards is the principal cause of 
the crisis. 
Member countries  of the potential  WAMZ have twice postponed the take–off for the 
single currency. Central bank experts of the up-coming EAMZ fear that plans for a common 
currency in 2012 maybe too ambitious as central banks in the five countries are given little time 
to prepare for the monetary union. In a recent meeting among EAMZ central  bank officials,  
experts have lamented the lack of knowledge in modeling and forecasting monetary policies, as 
well  as the implementation of reforms needed for a single currency union. In another recent 
meeting among elements of the WAMZ’s Convergence Council, questions have been raised over 
the achievement of monetary policy convergence. Three issues have resulted from these stylized 
facts: (1) the need for monetary policy convergence; (2) the imperative of bankers to understand 
modeling and forecasting methods in monetary policy transmission and; (3) the requirement of 
common structural and institutional characteristics among candidate countries.
In order to address the issues, the present analysis has been based on three foundations. 
(1) Real sector policies are designed to achieve macroeconomic performance through growth in 
GDP and GDP per capita  at  macro  and micro  levels  respectively.  (2) Monetary policies  are 
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designed  to  keep  inflation  in  check  and  improve  financial  intermediary  dynamics  of  depth 
(money supply and liquid liabilities), efficiency (at banking and financial system levels), activity 
(from banking and financial  system perspectives)  and size.  (3)  Fiscal  policy convergence  is 
designed to keep debt-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP ratios in check. We have also calculated the 
speeds of convergence and period required to achieve full (100%) convergence.
4.5.1 Absolute convergence
Absolute convergence is the result from factors such as monetary zones and the adoption 
of  a  single  currency,  among  others  (Nayaran  et  al.,  2011).  Absolute  convergence  in  real, 
monetary and fiscal policy implies, countries share the same fundamental characteristics with 
regard to the financial intermediary market such that the only difference across countries is in 
initial levels of financial intermediary market development. 
Since the mid 1980s, countries of the embryonic WAM and EAM zones have undertaken 
structural reform programs engineered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which have 
included financial liberalization for the most part. The vested agenda has been to reduce barriers 
to trade and increase foreign investment. Unlike other African countries without prospects for a 
single currency, the WAM and EAM zones member states are expected to benefit more in the 
reforms by virtue of reduced risks and low cross-border currency conversion costs in the flows of 
trade and investments among member countries. Owing to this financial liberalization, capital 
and exchange rate transaction controls have been substantially eased in the WAM and EAM 
zones. Also, advances in ICTs  have rendered the banking industry increasingly synchronized. 
This  synchronization  has also increased the speed of shock adjustment;  implying the rate at 
which one bank in the potential monetary zones adjusts when there is a shock in the other has 
increased.  All  these  factors  should  naturally  result  in  absolute  convergence.  However,  our 
findings do not reveal support for absolute convergence. It follows that, despite dissimilar initial 
levels in financial development, member states of the embryonic WAM and EAM zones do not 
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share the same fundamental characteristics. In other words, structural reform programs from the 
IMF and World Bank have not been  evenly implemented by candidate countries. 
4.5.2 Conditional convergence
According  to  the  economic  growth  literature (Barro,  1991),  conditional  convergence 
depicts convergence whereby, one’s own long-run stable state (equilibrium) is contingent on the 
different structural characteristics or fundamentals of each economy or market (Nayaran et al., 
2011). Still consistent with Narayan et al. (2011), when financial intermediary markets across 
countries differ in terms of factors relative to the performance of their markets, there could be 
conditional convergence. The convergence in dynamics of the banking sector is contingent on 
proxies  which  we  observe  and  empirically  model.  Our  results  are  thus   conditional  on  the 
macroeconomic  measures  we  have  used.  Note  should  be  taken  of  the  fact  that,  owing  to 
constraints  in data  availability  and degrees of freedom required for the OIR-Sargan test,  we 
conditioned  our  analysis  on  two  macroeconomic  variables:  consistent  with  the  convergence 
literature (Prichett, 1997; Bruno et al., 2011; Asongu, 2012). As we have found no evidence for 
this form of convergence, it follows that structural characteristics like macroeconomic policies 
are different across countries. Also, based on stylized facts presented in the motivation of the 
paper,  it  could  be  established   that,  this   insignificance  is  also  the  result  of  cross-country 
differences  in  institutional  characteristics  like  government  quality  (democracy,  control  of 
corruption, voice and accountability, rule of law, regulation quality, political stability…etc). 
On a final note, the findings of this paper are broadly consistent with the convergence 
literature on the EAMZ (Mkenda, 2001; Buigut & Valev, 2005) and, the WAMZ (Celasun & 
Justiniano, 2005; Debrun et al.,  2005; Tsangarides & Qureshi,  2008; Alagidede et al.,  2011) 
outlined in the literature section. 
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4.5.3 Policy implications 
In spite of common fundamental characteristics for candidate countries of the potential 
WAM and EAM zones (as they are implementing common policies in the run-up to the new 
monetary zones), we have found substantial insignificance in both types of convergences. These 
findings   have seven broad implications:  (1)  initial  conditions  for financial  development  are 
different across countries; (2) fundamental characteristics as common monetary policy initiatives 
and IMF backed financial  reform programs are implemented differently across countries;  (3) 
there  is  remarkable  evidence  of  cross-country  variations  in  structural  characteristics  of 
macroeconomic  performance;  (4)  institutional  cross-country  differences  could  also  be 
responsible for the deficiency in convergence within the potential monetary zones; (5) absence of 
fiscal  policy convergence  and no potential  for  eliminating  idiosyncratic  fiscal  shocks due to 
business cycle incoherence; (6) the findings are highly relevant for policy makers in terms of 
regional integration as they  question whether the policies implemented by candidate countries 
to promote financial integration have had any noticeable effects on the observed convergence 
patterns and; (7) the absence of strong links among banking sectors present some  opportunity 
for  portfolio  diversification.  This  absence  of  convergence  further  implies  that,  risk-adjusted 
returns denominated in a common currency will be  unequal throughout the candidate countries. 
In other words, there will be no possibility for similar yields for financial assets of similar risk 
and liquidity, regardless of nationality and locality.  Hence, candidate states should work towards 
harmonizing cross-country differences in structural and institutional characteristics that hamper 
the effectiveness of convergence in real, monetary and fiscal policies. This could be done by 
stringently monitoring the implementation of existing common initiatives and/or the adoption of 
new reforms programs.
Further  research could focus  on specific-policies  that  could  improve the convergence 
process. The fact that candidate states have different real, monetary and fiscal positions certainly 
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creates  implementation  problems.  Another  interesting  future  research  direction  could  be  the 
flexibility  needed  by  members  to   adjusted  their  existing  structural  and  institutional 
characteristics to meet targeted common standards. 
5. Conclusion 
A  spectre  is  hunting  embryonic  African  monetary  zones:  the  EMU  crisis.  The 
introduction of common currencies in  West and East Africa is facing stiff challenges in the 
timing of monetary convergence, the imperative of  policy makers to apply common modeling 
and  forecasting  methods  of  monetary  policy  transmission,  as  well  as  the  requirements  of 
common  structural  and  institutional  characteristics  among  candidate  states.  Inspired  by  the 
premise of the EMU crisis, this paper has assessed real, monetary and fiscal policy convergence 
within  the  potential  WAM  and  EAM  zones.  In  the  analysis,  monetary  policy  has  targeted 
inflation and financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size;  real sector policy has 
targeted economic performance in terms of GDP growth at macro and micro levels; while fiscal 
policy has targeted debt-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP ratios. Findings suggest overwhelming lack 
of convergence; an indication that candidate countries  still have to work towards harmonizing 
cross-country differences in  fundamental, structural and institutional characteristics that hamper 
the convergence process.
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Appendices 
  Appendix 1: Summary statistics (Combined data for WAMZ and EAMZ)
Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations
Financial Depth Money Supply 0.223 0.114 0.054 0.747 125
Liquid Liabilities 0.161 0.102 0.028 0.553 125
Financial 
Efficiency 
Banking  Efficiency 0.651 0.315 0.070 1.844 132
Financial  Efficiency 0.730 0.362 0.139 1.968 125
Financial 
Activity 
Banking  Activity 0.103 0.069 0.013 0.255 125
Financial  Activity 0.118 0.086 0.013 0.349 125
Financial  Size Financial  Size 0.563 0.242 0.054 1.155 130
Other Variables 
Openness (Trade) 54.581 26.818 6.320 138.76 129
Inflation 17.434 27.228 -100.00 196.12 120
Public Investment 7.180 3.719 0.000 15.734 106
GDP growth 3.584 6.759 -50.248 27.462 128
GDP per capita growth 0.752 6.200 -46.892 22.618 128
External Debt 80.724 49.561 5.197 209.24 131
Budget Deficit/Surplus -2.982 2.975 -9.325 2.095 32
S.D: Standard Deviation.  GDP: Gross Domestic Product
Appendix 2: Correlation analysis (Combined data for WAMZ and EAMZ)
Fin. Depth Fin. Efficiency Fin. Activity F. Size Other  Variables
M2 Fd BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Trade Infl. Pub. I GDP GDPpc Debt BD/S
1.00 0.98 0.07 0.01 0.79 0.78 0.53 0.46 -0.21 -0.15 -0.01 -0.04 0.14 0.34 M2
1.00 0.08 0.00 0.81 0.82 0.56 0.40 -0.20 -0.23 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.40 Fdgdp
1.00 0.92 0.59 0.56 0.39 0.16 -0.14 0.31 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 0.19 BcBd
1.00 0.47 0.50 0.36 0.03 -0.18 0.43 -0.16 -0.16 -0.03 -0.02 FcFd
1.00 0.95 0.68 0.42 -0.21 -0.07 -0.04 -0.08 0.07 0.43 Pcrb
1.00 0.64 0.30 -0.20 -0.10 -0.07 -0.10 0.04 0.33 Pcrbof
1.00 0.29 -0.25 0.04 0.08 0.05 -0.24 0.50 Dbacba
1.00 -0.12 0.13 0.00 -0.01 0.28 0.38 Trade
1.00 -0.03 0.29 0.26 -0.05 -0.24 Infl.
1.00 0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.35 Pub.I
1.00 0.97 -0.18 -0.009 GDPg
1.00 -0.16 -0.11 GDPpcg
1.00 -0.40  Debt
1.00 BD/S
M2 :Money Supply. Fd: Liquid liabilities. BcBd : Bank credit on Bank deposit. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposit. Prcb:Private domestic  
credit by deposit banks. Prcbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on deposit  
bank assets plus central bank assets. Pub.I: Public Investment. GDP: GDP growth. GDPpc: GDP per capita growth. Popg: Population growth. Debt: 
External Debt. BD/S: Budget Deficit/ Surplus.  Fin (F): Financial.
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Appendix 3: Variable definitions
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources
Inflation Infl. Consumer Price (Annual %) World Bank (WDI)
Openness Trade Imports(of goods and services) plus 
Exports(of goods and services) on GDP
World Bank (WDI)
Public  Investment PubI Gross Public Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)
 GDP Growtth GDPg Average annual GDP growth rate World Bank (WDI)
GDP per capita Growth GDPpcg Average annual GDP per capita growth rate World Bank (WDI)
Population Growth Popg Annual population growth rate World Bank (WDI)
Economic financial 
depth(Money Supply)
M2 Monetary Base plus demand, saving and 
time deposits (% of GDP)
World Bank (FDSD)
Financial system 
depth(Liquid liabilities)
Fdgdp Financial system deposits (% of GDP)  World Bank (FDSD)
Banking system 
allocation efficiency
BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD)
Financial system 
allocation efficiency
FcFd Financial system credit on Financial system 
deposits 
World Bank (FDSD)
Banking system activity Pcrb Private credit by deposit banks  (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD)
Financial system activity Pcrbof Private credit by deposit banks and other 
financial institutions (% of GDP)
World Bank (FDSD)
Financial size Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central banks assets 
plus deposit bank assets
World Bank (FDSD)
External Debt Ext.Debt Debt Oustanding (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)
Budget Deficit Deficit Cash Surplus/ Deficit (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits.  
Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit  
bank assets on Central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. WDI: World Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure 
Database. 
Appendix 4: Presentation of countries 
Zones Definitions Countries Number
WAMZ West African Monetary Zone The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea*, Nigeria, Sierra Leone 4
EAMZ East African Monetary Zone Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Uganda. 5
*Guinea is not included in the WAMZ Analysis owing to constraints in data availability. 
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